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Emrah Arbak∗ and Laurence Kranich†
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Abstract
We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with in-
terdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In par-
ticular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her
employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private informa-
tion. Thus, the wage proposal signals the intentions of the employer to
the worker. We show that if the workers have ”reasonable” beliefs, then
the unique prediction of the game is a separating equilibrium outcome in
which wages are fully informative about the intentions of the employer.
However, if there are several employers simultaneously bidding to hire a
single worker, then there may exist another equilibrium in which wages are
completely uninformative.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D82, J30
Keywords: Altruism, reciprocity, asymmetric information, labor rela-
tions, behavioral game theory.
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†Department of Economics, University at Albany, SUNY. Mailing address: 1400 Washington
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1. Introduction
It is quite clear that at least some of our daily interactions are inﬂuenced by
motives other than pure self-interest. While such a statement would face little or
no scrutiny in many disciplines, economists have systematically overlooked these
motives in the past. After all, for an economist who depicts an economic agent as
a rational and self-indulgent decision maker, all behavior must eventually lead to
some private gain. For example, if you give someone a gift, the only explanation
based on egocentric rationality is that you expect that your gift will induce a
favorable response from the other person and will ultimately yield a positive net
private gain. Recent experimental evidence, however, displays many instances in
which economic actors seem to be motivated by more than just their selﬁsh needs.
People contribute more than expected in experiments using simple games such as
ultimatum, dictator, gift-exchange, and public good games.
How does one come to care for another? Are we born to like some people and
dislike others, or are our extended preferences context-dependent, arising only
when a set of speciﬁc conditions are met? Recent experimental research indicates
that individuals seem to have a propensity to reward generous behavior and punish
unkind behavior.1 The dependence of one’s own motives upon the motives of
another is commonly observed in our daily interactions. Individuals constantly
consider certain actions as signs of respect, care, etc. These considerations are
the crucial fabric of the emotional arithmetic of a decision maker.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to a simple model of the labor market
where an employer oﬀers a wage schedule to a single worker. The wage is designed
not only to provide the proper incentives to work hard, but also to signal the
employer’s motives. If the worker believes that an employer is being genuinely
kind, he develops an aﬃnity for the employer and thus responds kindly by working
hard or not changing his job as soon as another employer oﬀers him a better
wage. Otherwise, if the employer’s behavior is interpreted as being motivated by
selﬁshness, the worker will respond as her selﬁsh needs guide her. We call our
model a loyalty model, since we consider the reciprocal actions of a worker based
on the (partial) observation of the employer’s motives. In other words, a worker
is loyal only if the employer has kind motives. However, this does not mean that
a selﬁsh employer never gets some form of loyalty. According to our model, a
1Ledyard [13] provides a review of public good experiments; Güth [12] and Roth [17] summa-
rizes experimental evidence regarding ultimatum games. See Camerer [5] for a general review
of the subject.
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selﬁsh employer indeed pays for loyalty at a pooling equilibrium. At a separating
equilibrium, however, being selﬁsh ensures that the workers will not be loyal or
kind in return.
One may wonder whether the information regarding an employer’s motives
is a factor in labor relations. A recent international survey of human resource
managers by Manpower Inc. reports that the managers rated ”keeping an open
and honest communication” as one of their top ”loyalty drivers.” The motives of
an employer can be a motivation for workers by way of loyalty. The motives of
an employer, however, are not always observable. In such instances, an employer
may be able to signal her motives by providing pecuniary and non-pecuniary
incentives. In this paper, we allow employers to oﬀer only pecuniary beneﬁts to
their workers.2 In this perspective, the interactions between an employer and a
worker may be interpreted as a gift-exchange.
The ﬁrst model to view labor relations as a partial gift exchange is Akerlof’s [1]
seminal article. According to Akerlof [1], a fair wage generates a positive feeling
to drive the employees to exert more eﬀort than a required minimum. In our
model wages do generate similar emotions, however, their ability to do so varies
with the economic environment. Moreover, our model does not consider fairness
or other forms of inequity concerns as a basis to explain behavior. This choice is
not motivated by a dismissal of the results obtained by utilizing notions of fairness
or equity.3 We do not allow fairness considerations to retain the simplicity of the
model.
Our model is quite similar to the approaches of Rabin [16] and Levine [14],
where individuals may choose to sacriﬁce their own welfare to help/punish those
that have been kind/unkind.4 Much like Levine’s [14] model, we do not consider
2The success of pecuniary beneﬁts to enhance loyalty has been questioned by some re-
searchers. However, there is also a growing realisation among human resource managers and
other professionals that wages and bonuses do serve as important tools in shaping loyalty. A
recent document, obtained from the website of a private consulting ﬁrm, headlined ”How to
Create Employee Loyalty”, argues that pay and beneﬁts help retain the most devoted workers.
Also, telephone interviews conducted by Beta Research Corporation ﬁnd that a quarter of the
hiring managers polled rate raises and bonuses as the most eﬀective programs that enhance
employee loyalty/retention; for article see Business Wire, May 7, 2003, p.2198.
3For more on inequity aversion as the basis for kindness, see Bolton and Ockenfels [3] and
Fehr and Schmidt [10].
4There is a fast growing literature that analyzes the consequences of reciprocal behavior and
related phenomenon. Our model is similar to Falk and Fischbacher’s [8] model of reciprocity,
although we consider a signalling game while the authors use a psychological game approach.
See Fehr and Gächter [9], Sethi and Somanathan [18], and Sobel [19] for revisions.
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a ”psychological game” in which agents payoﬀs may depend directly on beliefs as
well as actions.5 Instead, we allow a worker’s altruism coeﬃcient to be dependent
on the altruism coeﬃcient of an employer. Unlike Levine’s [14] model, however,
we do not allow the agents to be spiteful and focus on selﬁsh and kind motives.
Moreover, we are interested in a stylized labor market interaction, whereas Levine
[14] considers simple game forms.6
The results of our model show that employers can indeed signal their inten-
tions in some cases. In particular, we ﬁnd that by imposing a relatively weak
restriction on the beliefs of workers, there exists a unique separating equilibrium.
However, we ﬁnd that signalling possibilities are signiﬁcantly reduced if several
employers compete to hire a single worker or if appearing to be selﬁsh reduces
an employer’s ability to attract workers. These results seem to lend support to
some of the experimental ﬁndings of Charness and Haruvy [6] which shows that
allowing wages to be determined by an external process reduces an agent’s will-
ingness to reciprocate. Our results also resembles the ﬁndings of Prasnikar and
Roth [15] who report that increasing the number of proposers in an ultimatum
game experiment produces outcomes that are similar to the standard predictions
of game theory.
2. Simple model
Consider a sequential interaction in which an employer wishes to hire a worker for
a one-time project with an uncertain outcome, y. To simplify matters, suppose
that the project yields either no output or a single unit of output, y = 0, 1. The
outcome of the project is dependent on the worker’s eﬀort 0 · e · 1, which also
equals the project’s probability of success. The expected output of the project is
simply e · 1+(1− e) · 0 = e. Throughout the paper, we maintain that the worker’s
eﬀort is private information.
The task of the employer is to devise a compensation scheme that provides the
necessary incentives to work. In the ﬁrst stage, the employer proposes a payment
schedule, wy, dependent, at least partially, on the outcome of the project, with
0 · w · 1.7 In the second stage, the worker either accepts the employer’s oﬀer
5See the seminal article of Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti [11] on psychological games.
6See also Bernheim and Severinov [2] for a signaling game similar to ours.
7An implicit assumption here is that the employer is liquidity constrained, such that she can
only consider a payment schedule dependent on the outcome of the project. See the Appendix
for an extension of our results in this section by allowing the employer to diversify her risks by
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w and chooses to devote some eﬀort e — with the understanding that she will be
paid in the event that the project is a success — or rejects the oﬀer altogether to
obtain her default utility, u = 0.
Let the opportunity cost of the project be equivalent to the production unit’s
sale value, denoted by the constant r > 0. The employer needs to pay this oppor-
tunity cost to the actual owners of the production unit. Alternatively, r may be
interpreted as the cost of capital, or the rent paid to the owners of the stock of
capital. Let r be given exogenously.
We assume that both the employer and the worker are risk-neutral. Then, the
expected proﬁt of an employer is
π(w, e|r) = (1− w)e− r. (2.1)
Similarly, the expected private utility of a worker is given by
u(w, e) = we− g(e), (2.2)
where g : [0, 1]→ R+ signiﬁes the worker’s cost of eﬀort. We assume that g is C3,
g(0) = 0, g0, g00 > 0 on (0, 1], and g000 ≥ 0. Lastly, let us assume that g satisﬁes
the Inada condition g0(0) = 0 and g0(1) > 1, which are suﬃcient to ensure interior
solutions for the worker’s eﬀort decision.
Apart from their selﬁsh interests, an employer and a worker may also care
about each other’s welfare. We ﬁrst consider the employer’s extended preferences.
Imagine that the motive of an employer is exogenously given and determined by
a random move of nature. The extended (expected) payoﬀ of a type i employer
is then given by
Vi(w, e|r) = π(w, e|r) + αiu(w, e). (2.3)
Suppose that there are two types of employers, i = K,M with αK > αM = 0,
such that type M employers are solely proﬁt maximizing and type K employers
are kind, or benevolent. Let pi denote the probability that nature picks a type i
employer.
While an employer may be innately kind, a worker cares for the employer in a
reciprocal manner — only if she believes that the employer also cares for her. Then,
the employer’s compensation scheme may provide the worker hints regarding her
underlying motives. Unlike other models of reciprocity, a ”good” oﬀer does not
employing a large number of workers, which allows the employer to also include a ﬁxed payment
component.
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automatically trigger a reciprocal response from the worker. After all, the worker
knows that a materialist employer may be interested in being recognized as a
caring employer by making an oﬀer that makes the worker uncertain, if doing so
yields the employer greater proﬁts. Therefore, the worker responds reciprocally
only if she has reason to believe that the employer’s oﬀer is genuine and reﬂects
her underlying kindness.
Let µi ∈ [0, 1] be the worker’s belief about the employer’s type, such that
µi = 1 if the worker believes that the employer has type i motives. Also, let
µ = (µK , µM) denote the vector of beliefs. The worker’s extended (expected)
payoﬀ is
U(w, e, b|r) = u(w, e) + b · π(w, e|r), (2.4)
where the worker’s care about the employer’s proﬁt is simply
b = β · µK · αK .
In the previous equation, µKαK represents the worker’s anticipation of the em-
ployer’s altruism coeﬃcient and β ∈ [0, 1] determines the extent to which the
worker cares for the employer’s motives. Since the worker’s objective function U
is strictly concave in e, her best response to wage w is uniquely identiﬁed. Let
E(w, b) = arg max
e∈[0,1]
U(w, e, b|r) (2.5)
denote the worker’s best response function.
A worker agrees to work only if the employer’s oﬀer yields a suﬃciently large
private payoﬀ, or only if u ≥ 0.8 If there is more than a single employer, then the
worker may compare the employers’ oﬀers by considering their implied extended
payoﬀs. We consider such extensions in the following sections. In this section, we
focus solely on an interaction between an employer and a worker.
It is easy to show that a positive wage will make the worker better-oﬀ than
her default utility if the worker knows with certainty that the employer is type
M , or that
max
e∈[0,1]
u(w, e) ≥ 0,
for all w ≥ 0, holding with equality only when w = 0.
Since the employer is liquidity-constrained, she chooses to implement the
project only if π ≥ 0. Otherwise, the employer will choose not to implement
8We may justify this restriction by interpreting a negative private utility as a below substi-
nance payoﬀ associated with inferior health status, being homeless, etc.
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the project and will earn her reservation proﬁt of zero. Let us assume that for
some wage the project yields strictly positive proﬁts even if the worker believes
that the employer is materialist, or that
π(w, E(w, 0)|r) > 0
for some w ≥ 0.9
We have not yet pinned down the information structure of our model. The
assumption that the worker’s eﬀort is not observable by the employer is maintained
throughout the paper. There is another potential form of information imperfection
in our model: The employer’s motives may not be revealed to the worker. In that
case, the wage oﬀer not only provides incentives but may also be informative
about the employer’s motive. Before discussing the resulting signalling model in
detail, in the next subsection we brieﬂy consider the implications of our model
when the employer’s type is public information.
2.1. Observed Motives
When the employer’s motives are observable, then a type i = K,M employer’s
decision in the ﬁrst stage can be speciﬁed as follows:
max
w∈[0,1]
Vi(w, E(w, bi)|r) s.t. u(w, E(w, bi)) ≥ 0 (2.6)
with bi = β · αi.
The next lemma summarizes some important properties of the best-response
function E when the worker’s care for the employer, bi, is exogenously determined.
Lemma 2.1. E(·, ·) is strictly increasing in both its arguments and concave in w.
Also, Vi(w, E(w, bi)|r) is concave in w.
Proof. Let w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1] with w2 6= w1 and wγ = γw1 + (1 − γ)w2 for some
γ ∈ [0, 1]. Also, in order to ease notation, let Ex = E(wx, b). We write the ﬁrst-
order condition corresponding to the optimization problem given in equation (2.5)
as
w(1− b) + b− g0(e∗) = 0, (2.7)
9In order to prove that such a wage exists, it is suﬃcient to show that the worker exerts a
strictly positive amount of eﬀort when b = 0. To see this, note that our assumption regarding
g0 ensures that ﬁrst order derivative of the worker’s objective function u is strictly positive for
e = 0 and w > 0, i.e. w − g0 (0) > 0 for any w > 0.
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where e∗ = E(w, b). Then,
0 = γ (w1(1− b) + b− g0(E1)) + (1− γ) (w2(1− b) + b− g0(E2))
= wγ(1− b) + b− γg0(E1)− (1− γ)g0(E2)
Since g0 is convex, we have g0(γE1+(1−γ)E2) · γg0(E1)+(1−γ)g0(E2). Substituting
this inequality into the previous equation, we get
0 = wγ(1− b) + b− γg0(E1)− (1− γ)g0(E2)
· wγ(1− b) + b− g0(γE1 + (1− γ)E2).
But this means that the worker should respond to wage wγ by working no less
than γE1 + (1− γ)E2, or by setting Eγ ≥ γE1 + (1− γ)E2.
To show that Vi is concave in w, we ﬁrst write
Vi(wγ, Eγ |r) = (1− wγ)Eγ + αi (wγEγ − g(Eγ))− r
= (1− wγ (1− αi)) Eγ − αig(Eγ)− r.
Now, we know from above that Eγ ≥ γE1 +(1− γ)E2, and since −g(·) is (strictly)
concave, by deﬁnition, −g(Eγ) is concave in w. Then,
Vi(wγ, Eγ |r) ≥ γE1 + (1− γ)E2
− (1− αi) (γw1 + (1− γ)w2) (γE1 + (1− γ)E2)
−αi (γg(E1) + (1− γ)g(E2))− r
= γE1 + (1− γ)E2
− (1− αi) (γw1E1 + (1− γ)w2E2 − γ(1− γ)(w1 − w2)(E1 − E2))
−αi (γg(E1) + (1− γ)g(E2))− r
Rearranging further, we have
Vi(wγ, Eγ |r) ≥ γ(1− w1 (1− αi))E1 + (1− γ)(1− w2 (1− αi))E2
+γ(1− γ) (1− αi) (w1 − w2)(E1 − E2)
−αi (γg(E1) + (1− γ)g(E2))− r.
Note that our previous ﬁndings show that (w1 − w2)(E1 − E2) ≥ 0, which allows
us to rearrange the previous term as
Vi(wγ, Eγ |r) ≥ γ ((1− w1 (1− αi))E1 − αig(E1)− r)
+(1− γ) ((1− w2 (1− αi))E2 − αig(E2)− r)
= γVi(w1, E1|r) + (1− γ)Vi(w2, E2|r).
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Since the employer’s motive is publicly observed, we may want to characterize
the relationship between the employer’s wage choice and the worker’s reaction
coeﬃcient, β. As our previous result shows if β is large, then the worker will work
harder for any given wage. In other words, a reactive worker may need less than
the usual incentives to work if the employer is benevolent, since the employer’s
welfare is integrated into the worker’s objective. Then, it may be proﬁtable for
the employer to oﬀer a relatively lower wage to a more reactionary worker. Our
next result supports our intuition.
Corollary 2.2. The employer’s wage oﬀer w is strictly decreasing in β.
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for the worker is
∂ [we− g(e) + βαi(1− w)e]
∂e
= w + βαi(1− w)− g0(e)
= 0.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the worker’s optimization, we get
∂E
∂w =
1− αiβ
g00
> 0, (2.8)
∂E
∂β =
αi(1− w)
g00
> 0. (2.9)
Substituting the worker’s optimal response rule, g0(e) = w + βαi(1 − w), the
ﬁrst order condition for a type i employer can be written as
∂ [(1− w)E + αi (wE − g(E))]
∂w
=
∂E
∂w · (1− (1− αi)w − αig
0(E))− (1− αi)E (2.10)
=
µµ
1− αiβ
g00
¶
·
¡
1− α2iβ
¢
(1− w)
¶
− (1− αi)E = 0 (2.11)
where E = E(w, bi). Our result follows since the function on the left side of the
last equation decreases with β.
The next example illustrates the previous result.
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Figure 2.1: Wages when the employer’s type is kind and observable.
Example 2.3. Let us assume that g(e) = e2. If the employer is materialist then
it can easily be shown that e = 1
4
and w = 1
2
. If the employer is kind, then the
worker’s optimization yields the following best response function:
E(w,αβ) = 1
2
(w + αβ (1− w)) .
The employer’s optimization yields the wages as a function of the kindness of the
employer, α, and the responsiveness of the worker, β, as depicted in ﬁgure 2.1.
2.2. Signaling with reasonable beliefs
Suppose now that the employer’s type is unobserved and that the worker has to
draw inferences about the employer’s motive from her oﬀer. In other words, we
now allow µ to be a function of w. Also, we consider only pure strategies. We
next deﬁne our equilibrium concept.
Deﬁnition 2.4. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the signaling game is
a proﬁle (w∗i , e
∗ (w) , µ∗i (w))i∈{M,K} that satisﬁes the following conditions.
(P1) For all w ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium eﬀort levels are also optimal:
e∗(w) = E(w,βµ∗K(w)αK). (2.12)
(P2) For all i =M,K, the equilibrium wage w∗i is optimal:
Vi(w
∗
i , e
∗(w∗i )) ≥ Vi(w, e∗(w)) (2.13)
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for any w ∈ [0, 1].
(B) For all i = M,K, the worker’s beliefs obey Bayes’ rule, whenever
applicable:
µ∗i (w) =
piσ∗i (w)P
pjσ∗j(w)
, (2.14)
where
σ∗i (w) =
½
1 if w = w∗(αi),
0 otherwise,
and
P
piσ∗i (w) > 0.
A simple but important property of most signaling models is that the sender’s,
i.e. the employer’s, indiﬀerence curves cross only once. A direct consequence of
this property is that the receiver’s actions are monotonic in the sender’s messages.
When such a simple relationship exists between the two choice variables, senders
may be separated by their actions.
The single-crossing property is not necessarily satisﬁed here. To see this,
note that the marginal payoﬀ from eﬀort may actually be negative for a type K
employer — since additional eﬀort may be too costly for the worker — while it is
always non-negative for a type M employer. In other words, the preferences of a
caring employer may exhibit a ”bliss-point”, above which any additional amount of
eﬀort actually subtracts from the extended welfare of the employer. This negative
eﬀect originates from the benevolence of the employer. While a bliss-point does
not exist for a materialist employer, simply because increasing the worker’s eﬀort
level never decreases the employer’s proﬁt, a kind employer also considers the
marginal disutility of eﬀort implied by any contract. For suﬃciently high eﬀort
levels, the marginal value of eﬀort may be negative for a type K employer, and
thus our model invites the possibility of multiple-crossing indiﬀerence curves, as
shown in Figure 2.2.
Example 2.5. Let us, as before, assume that g(e) = e2, r = 0, and α = 0.7.
Then, the indiﬀerence curves are determined by the equations
VK(w, e) = (1− w) e+ 0.7
¡
we− e2
¢
= C,
VM(w, e) = (1− w) e = C,
where C is some constant. Figure 2.2 depicts the indiﬀerence curves for both
types of agents when C = 0.2. Note that the indiﬀerence curve of a kind employer
11
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Figure 2.2: The indiﬀerence curves for both types of employers when g(e) = e2
and α = 0.7.
has a bliss-point at (w, e) ≈ (0.84, 0.53). Indeed, with these parameters, a kind
employer’s welfare diminishes in eﬀort e, for any e > 0.53, holding wage w con-
stant. The materialist employer’s welfare, on the other hand, is always improved
if the worker exerts more eﬀort for any constant wage.
Fortunately, one can show that our model satisﬁes the single-crossing property
for the range of choices that are of interest to us. We now deﬁne
ε(w) =
[
µ∈[0,1]
E(w,αβµ)
to designate the worker’s set of best responses to w corresponding to all possible
beliefs. Note that with the parameters used in the previous example, the worker’s
choices are bounded from above, ε(1) · 1/2 < 0.53, as depicted on Figure 2.2.
Lemma 2.6. The employer’s preferences satisfy the single-crossing property for
all w ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [0, ε(1)].
Proof. Note that for any w ∈ [0, 1], ε(w) can be alternatively described as
ε(w) = {e : γ − g0(e) = 0 for all γ ∈ [w,w + βαK(1− w)]} .
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Then, 1 = g0(e) if {e} = ε(1). Also, since g is strictly convex, it is easy to show
that for any e < ε(1), 1 > g0(e).
The slopes of the two indiﬀerence curves VM(w, e) = A and VK(w, e) = A0 are
given by
∂w
∂e
¯¯¯
¯
VM=A
=
1− w
e
=
(1− w)(1− αK)
e(1− αK)
> 0
∂w
∂e
¯¯¯
¯
VK=A0
=
1− w(1− αK)− αKg0(e)
e(1− αK)
=
(1− w)(1− αK) + αK (1− g0(e))
e(1− αK)
Then, ∂w∂e
¯¯
VM=A
· ∂w∂e
¯¯
VK=A0
for any w ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [0, ε(1)]. Moreover, the
inequality holds strictly for all e < ε(1).
Our model, much like most signaling models, suﬀers from the multiple equi-
libria problem. More succinctly, the equilibrium concept does not help us pin
down a particular outcome over others. Rather, the equilibrium outcomes that
are characterized by (P1), (P2), and (B) are numerous and have diﬀerent charac-
teristics. For example, under our assumptions so far we can have both separating
equilibria where the worker correctly deduces the employer’s motive, and pooling
equilibria in which the two types can not be distinguished.
The multiplicity of equilibria, however, can be overcome by introducing ”rea-
sonable” restrictions on oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs for the workers. The restrictions we
impose on the worker’s beliefs are based on the reﬁnement concept of ”intuitive
criterion”, introduced by Cho and Kreps [7].
Given an equilibrium proﬁle (w∗(·), e∗(·), µ∗(·)), where µ∗(·) = (µ∗M(·), µ
∗
K(·)),
let V ∗i = Vi(w
∗(αi), e∗(w∗)) denote the equilibrium payoﬀ of a type i employer.
We say that wage w is equilibrium dominated for employer i =M,K if
V ∗i > max
e∈ε(w)
Vi(w, e). (2.15)
LetΘ∗(w) ⊂ {M,K} denote the types of employers for which condition (2.15) fails
to hold. In other words, i ∈ Θ∗(w) only if w is not equilibrium dominated, or if
V ∗i · maxe∈ε(w) Vi(w, e). The next condition summarizes our reﬁnement concept.
(R) A PBE (w∗(·), e∗(·), µ∗(·)) has reasonable beliefs if for all w with
Θ∗(w) 6= ∅, µ∗i (w) > 0 is true only if i ∈ Θ∗(w).
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As in most models that utilize the intuitive criterion and its close variants, the
restrictions on oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs signiﬁcantly reduce the number of possible
equilibria. For example, condition (R) ensures that if Θ∗(w) = i for some oﬀer w,
then the degenerate belief that the employer is type i, µi(w) = 1, is reasonable,
since j /∈ Θ∗(w) implies that µj(w) = 0. Our next result characterizes the PBE
that are supported by reasonable beliefs.
Proposition 2.7. There is a unique separating PBE outcome (w∗ (·) , e∗ (·)) with
equilibrium beliefs µ∗(·) that satisfy (R).
Proof. Let (w∗, e∗(·), µ∗(·)) any pooling equilibrium proﬁle that satisﬁes (P1),
(P2), and (B) and let V ∗K and V
∗
M be the corresponding payoﬀs for each type of
employer.
We now show that a pooling equilibrium cannot be supported by beliefs that
satisfy (R) . In order to prove this, it is suﬃcient to show that there exists some
wage w0 which is feasible with belief µK (w
0) = 1, i.e. π (w0, E(w0,βαK)) ≥ 0, such
that
V ∗K · VK(w
0, E(w0,βαK)), (2.16)
V ∗M > VM(w
0, E(w0, βαK)). (2.17)
The ﬁrst inequality requires that w0 makes K at least as well oﬀ as in the pooling
outcome. The second inequality ensures that M strictly prefers the pooling out-
come to (w0, E(w0,βαK)). If beliefs are reasonable, these two inequalities ensure
that by oﬀering w0, a kind employer can (and would weakly prefer to) signal her
intentions to the worker, i.e. µK(w
0) = 1 since Θ∗ (w0) = {K}. Consequently, the
two inequalities (2.16-2.17) refute that a pooling equilibrium satisﬁes (R).
First, note that the equilibrium payoﬀ of a materialist must be strictly positive,
or that V ∗M > 0. To see this, suppose otherwise, or that V
∗
M · 0. Our assumption
regarding the proﬁtability of the project ensures that there exists some w00 such
that π (w00, E(w00, 0)) > 0. Since E and π are increasing in their second arguments,
then a type M employer would be better oﬀ by oﬀering w00 — no matter what the
employer believes — contradicting condition (P2) for a materialist at the pooling
equilibrium.
We now prove that there exists some w0 that satisﬁes both conditions (2.16)
and (2.17). Using the argument in the proof of Lemma 2.6, we can verify that
the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves that intersect at the pooling equilibrium,
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VM(w, e) = V
∗
M and VK(w, e) = V
∗
K , are ordered, such that
∂w
∂e
¯¯¯
¯
VK=V
∗
K
>
∂w
∂e
¯¯¯
¯
VM=V
∗
M
> 0, (2.18)
for any w ∈ [0, 1) and e ∈ [0, E(1)).10
Let us deﬁne w0 as the greatest wage that yields a materialist employer
payoﬀ of V ∗M when the worker believes that the employer is kind, i.e. w0 =
max {w ∈ [0, 1] : VM (w, E(w, βαK)) = V ∗M} .11 It is easy to show that w0 > w∗.
Note that w0 < 1 since V ∗M > 0. Then, equation (2.18) and Lemma 2.6 imply
that VK (w
0, E(w0,βαK)) > V ∗K. Since E is continuous, increasing in its second
argument, and V ∗M > 0, there exists some feasible wage w
0 > w0 which satisﬁes
both conditions (2.16) and (2.17).
Now let (w∗(·), e∗(·), µ∗(·)) be any separating equilibrium proﬁle that satisﬁes
(P1), (P2), and (B). First, note at a separating equilibrium the indiﬀerence
curve for a materialist employer and the best response E (·, 0) have to be tangent
to each other at point (w∗ (0) , e∗(w∗ (0))) . To see this, note that (P1) and (B)
imply that (w∗ (0) , e∗(w∗ (0))) has to be a point on the best response function
for a materialist, E (·, 0). Assume now that the materialist employer’s indiﬀerence
curve that passes through (w∗ (0) , e∗(w∗ (0))) is not tangent to E (·, 0) . But this
would imply that there exists some w0 and a corresponding best response eﬀort
e0 = E (w0, 0) such that VM (w
0, e0) > V ∗M , contradicting (P2) .
Given that a materialist worker’s indiﬀerence curve has to be tangent to
E (·, 0) , we now turn to the equilibrium choice of a kind employer. Let
Φ∗K ≡ {w ∈ [0, 1] : Θ∗(w) = K}
determine the set of wages that a type K employer may use to signal her type.
We know from our discussion above that Φ∗K is non-empty. Then, oﬀering a wage
that exceeds lower bound of Φ∗K, i.e. w > wl = minw Φ∗K , violates (P2) and thus
can not be an equilibrium wage. This means that (w∗K , E(w
∗
K, βαK)) must be on
the indiﬀerence curve that is deﬁned by VM (w, e) = V ∗M . Lastly, the equilibrium
10Since r > 0, w = 1 can not be a feasible oﬀer and is not considered.
11It is easy to show that there is at least one wage w such that VM (w, E(w,βαK)) = V ∗M .
To see this, note that assuming otherwise would imply that there exists no point on the graph
of E(w,βαK) that a materialist employer prefers to the pooling equilibrium. This is impossible
since the pooling equilibrium is a point on the graph of E(w,βpKαK), which implies less eﬀort
for any given wage.
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wage w∗K = wl is feasible since, by using the same argument we have used above
for a pooling equilibrium, one can show that V ∗M > 0 has to be true at a separating
equilibrium.
Our previous result shows that wage signals successfully reveal the motives of
an employer in the simple setting we have identiﬁed. In other words, a materialist
employer is unable to extract any loyalty from the worker. This result goes against
the popular belief that wages and bonuses are eﬀective only in providing pecuniary
incentives.12
The uniqueness result, however, depends crucially on the economic context
surrounding the labor market interaction. We next illustrate with an example
that if the employer is unable to secure positive proﬁts by being recognized as a
materialist, then pooling outcomes may not be ruled out by the reasonable beliefs
described by (R). Moreover, in such a case it is also possible that the project may
not be implemented at all.
Example 2.8. Let g(e) = e2, r = 0.2, β = 0.9, αK = 0.8, and pK = 0.5. Then,
the best response function of the worker is given by
E(w, b) =
1
2
(w + (1− b)w) ,
where b = βαKµK . We depict four possible outcomes in Figure 2.3. Panel a)
depicts the case where an equilibrium belief proﬁle µ∗K where neither type ﬁnds
it feasible to implement the project. Note, in particular, that µ∗K · pK for all
w. Panel b) depicts the separating PBE outcome in which the type K employer
chooses a wage that successfully signals her type. The PBE action proﬁle is where
the two curves V ∗M and V
∗
K intersect. The type M employer does not implement
the project. Panels c) and d) depict two pooling PBE outcomes.
3. Local Interaction
Most labor interactions have a local aspect, in that some employers are better
known then others. In this section, we consider an extreme case in which the
12One may critize the above ﬁnding on the grounds that the model is too simplistic and does
not take account of intricate details of labor relations. For example, employers are usually not
as liquidity constrained as we have assumed. Most labor contracts include a ﬁxed wage as well
as a bonus, dependent on output level, past proﬁts, etc. However, as shown in the appendix,
relaxing the liquidity constraints to allow the employer to oﬀer a ﬁxed wage scheme does not
aﬀect our qualitative results.
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Figure 2.3: The four outcomes for Example 2.8.
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worker has perfect information regarding the motive of one employer but is un-
certain about the motive of the other. It is quite easy to see that if the local
employer is a materialist, the worker will choose to work with another local em-
ployer who is known to be kind. We rule out such a case since local employers
that do not care about their workers are probably eliminated in the long run.
Suppose then that the ﬁrst (local) employer is observed to be kind. The
motive of the second (outsider) employer, however, is unobserved. Since the
worker can perfectly observe the motive of the ﬁrst employer, in this section the
vector µ = (µK, µM) refers to beliefs regarding the second employer’s motives. Let
r1, r2 > 0 and w1, w2 ≥ 0 denote the capital costs and oﬀers of the two employers.
Notice that if r2 = r1, then the set of feasible wages that can be oﬀered by the two
employer are identical if the worker believes that the second employer is kind, or
if µK = 1. Also, let us assume that if the worker is indiﬀerent between the oﬀers
of the two employers then she will always choose to work for the local employer.13
Our model in this section can easily be interpreted as a model of loyalty, in
which the worker chooses either to continue working for a local ﬁrm or to start
working for the second (outsider) ﬁrm. As in the previous section, we only consider
cases where both employers can make positive proﬁts even if the worker believes
that they are materialistic:
π(w, E(w, 0)|ri) > 0
for some w and for both employers i = 1, 2.
The next result shows that unless the second employer’s capital cost is suf-
ﬁciently smaller than some threshold level, the ﬁrst employer will be able to
persuade the worker to work for her and secure a strictly positive proﬁt.
Lemma 3.1. Given the worker’s belief, µK ∈ [0, 1], there exists some strictly
increasing threshold, Ω(µK) · r1, such that if r2 ≥ Ω(µK) then the local employer
will be able to persuade the worker to work for her by oﬀering the wage w∗1 > 0.
The threshold is equivalent to the rent of local employer if worker believes that
the outsider employer is kind with certainty, such that Ω(1) = r1.
Proof. The value for threshold Ω can be found by the solution to the following
system of equations for the ﬁve variables Y = [w1, e1, w2, e2,Ω]:
13This assumption is simply to retain the simplicity of our model and does not alter any of
our results.
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w1 − g0(e1) + βαK(1− w1) = 0 (3.1)
w2 − g0(e2) + βαKµK(1− w2) = 0 (3.2)
(1− w2) e2 − Ω = 0 (3.3)
(1− w1) e1 − r1 = 0 (3.4)
U(w, e, βαK |r1)− U(w, e,βαKµK |r2) = 0. (3.5)
The ﬁrst two equations (3.1-3.2) determine the worker’s best responses, e1 and e2,
to wages w1 and w2. Note that these two equations imply that e2 · e1. Equation
(3.3) deﬁnes the threshold as a function of the wage oﬀered by the second employer
and the worker’s best response to that wage. Equation (3.4) sets the greatest
feasible wage that can be oﬀered by employer 1 to compete with the wage oﬀered
by employer 2. Lastly, equation (3.5) relates the wages and eﬀorts that make the
worker indiﬀerent between working for the ﬁrst or the second employer. These
equations ensure that if r2 ≥ Ω(µK) then the outsider employer may oﬀer some
feasible wage that will persuade the worker.
In order to see that Ω is strictly increasing, we implicitly diﬀerentiate equations
(3.1-3.5) to get


∂w1
∂µK∂e1
∂µK∂w2
∂µK∂e2
∂µK∂Ω
∂µ
K


= −


1− βαK −g00 (e1) 0 0 0
0 0 1− βαKµK −g00 (e2) 0
0 0 −e2 −w2 −1
−e1 −w1 0 0 0
e1 (1− βαK) 0 −e2 (1− βαKµK) 0 0


−1
×


0
βαK(1− w2)
0
0
−βαK(1− w2)e2


.
The above calculation gives us how the threshold responds to µK :
∂Ω
∂µK
= βαK (1− w2)
e2
1− βαKµK
> 0.
If µK = 1, equations (3.1) and (3.2) deﬁne identical response functions. Then,
equations (3.3) and (3.4) also need to be identical, such that Ω (1) = r1. Since Ω
is increasing, then Ω (µK) < r1 for all µK < 1.
19
The previous result exhibits a simple consequence of loyalty. Unless the second
employer oﬀers a suﬃciently larger wage, the worker will choose the ﬁrst player
that she knows is kind. Therefore, the worker not only works harder but also
chooses the ﬁrst employer even if her outside option is slightly better.
Corollary 3.2. When r2 ≥ Ω(1), the outsider employer can not oﬀer a wage
large enough to employ the worker. When r2 < Ω(0), there is a unique separating
outcome that satisﬁes (R) in which the worker will work for the outsider employer
no matter what her type is.
Proof. By the deﬁnition of threshold Ω, when r2 ≥ Ω(1), the outsider employer
can not oﬀer a feasible wage to hire the worker.14 When r2 < Ω(0), the outsider
employer can make a feasible wage oﬀer which is strictly better than the local
employer’s oﬀer by revealing her type, no matter what her type is. The rest of
the proof for this case is identical to the proof of Proposition 2.7.
Our next result shows another interesting aspect of our model. The model
has a pooling equilibrium with reasonable beliefs when a materialist (outsider)
employer is unable to hire the worker by revealing her type while a kind (outsider)
employer is able to hire the worker. Note that these results are similar in spirit
to those that were illustrated in Example 2.8.
Proposition 3.3. Assume that r2 ∈ [Ω(0),Ω(1)). There are multiple equilibria,
including pooling equilibria, that satisfy (R). In a separating equilibrium, a ma-
terialist (outsider) employer has no wage to persuade the worker while a kind
(outsider) employer obtains zero proﬁts. The outcomes can further be character-
ized as follows:
i). When r2 ∈ [Ω(0),Ω(pK)], the worker will work for the local em-
ployer only at a separating equilibrium and only if the outsider em-
ployer is type M .
ii). When r2 ∈ (Ω(pK),Ω(1)), the worker will work for the outsider
employer only at a separating equilibrium and only if she is type K.
Proof. When Ω(0) · r2 < Ω(1), the kind employer can oﬀer a feasible which will
persuade the worker to work for her. However, within the same range, a materialist
14Note our assumption that the worker will always choose the local employer if she is indiﬀerent
between the oﬀers of local and outsider employers.
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employer has no feasible wage which will persuade the worker by revealing her
type. In fact, the only separating equilibrium that satisﬁes (P2) must be yield
both types zero proﬁts. It is easy to see why the materialist obtains zero proﬁts in
a separating equilibrium: She simply has no feasible wage to persuade the worker
to work for her instead of the local employer. As for a kind worker, let us assume
instead that she may obtain positive proﬁt by oﬀering some feasible wage wK , such
that π (wK , E (wK ,βαK)) > 0. But then, the materialist worker has an incentive
to oﬀer wK instead of revealing her type by oﬀering some wage wM 6= wK. This
would violate (P2) and (B) and therefore π (w∗K , E (w∗K , βαK)) = 0 has to hold at
a separating equilibrium.
The previous paragraph also shows that there exists no feasible wage that
satisﬁes condition 2.17 in the proof of Proposition 2.7. The simple reason is that
in a separating equilibrium a materialist employer always obtains zero proﬁts since
she is never chosen by the worker. Then, any wage w0 that satisﬁes condition 2.17
is infeasible by deﬁnition, since the condition requires
VM(w
0, E(w0,βαK)) < V ∗M = 0.
Therefore, (R) does not help us weed out any pooling equilibria.
With these in mind, when r2 ∈ [Ω(0),Ω(pK)], both types of employers can
feasibly oﬀer a wage to hire a worker at a pooling equilibrium. The worker will
choose to work for the local employer only at a separating equilibrium and when
the employer is a materialist. Finally, when r2 ∈ (Ω(pK),Ω(1)] there exists no
feasible pooling equilibrium wage that makes the worker choose the outsider em-
ployer. The outsider employer can oﬀer a feasible wage to hire the worker only at
a separating equilibrium and only if she is kind.
4. Conclusion
The main concern of this paper has been whether motives could be signalled
through diﬀerent wage oﬀers. We ﬁrst observed that with a single employer signals
were used to their fullest extent, separating the two types of employers. The
results in the previous section however showed us that with two employers and a
single worker, if the worker had an aﬃnity to a kind employer, then unless the
other employer oﬀered a suﬃciently high wage, the worker will always choose the
kind employer. As we noted in the beginning of the paper, if appearing to be
selﬁsh reduces an employer’s ability to attract workers, then the only equilibrium
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that is supported by reasonable beliefs may reduce the employer’s ability to signal
their types.
The results obtained in the last section may also explain why loyalty percep-
tions have been declining for big companies. As technology advances, capital costs
decline, enabling some employers to oﬀer high wages that break the pull of loyalty
for some workers. The problem is that a kind employer may not be able to signal
her type properly, since appearing to be selﬁsh results in inferior net earnings.
Therefore, all employers oﬀer a high (pooling) wage, which evidently reduces the
ﬂow of information.
5. Appendix
In this appendix, we assume that there is a large number N of identical workers
to be employed by a single employer. We assume that the number of workers
is suﬃciently large such that the employer may pool her entire production risk
by hiring all the workers. In this setting, an employer may choose to oﬀer a
compensation scheme ω(y) = w0 + wy, with a strictly positive ﬁxed payment,
w0 > 0. Note however that in our framework the ﬁxed payment w0 cannot be
interepreted as an insurance, since both the worker and the employer are risk-
neutral. Instead, w0 is just another tool that can be used to signal the employer’s
motive. Intuitively, the ﬁxed payment is a much more attractive signalling device
than the conditional payment w since it does not alter the worker’s incentives.
As there are a large number of workers, the employer’s total revenue from
hiring all N workers is given by Ne. The employer’s feasibility constraints are
now deﬁned as
0 · w · 1 and 0 · w0 · e (1− w) ,
where the last inequality follows from the requirement that total payments must
be less than total revenues, or that N (w0 + we) · Ne.
The expected private payoﬀs of the worker and the employer can be given by
u(ω, e) = ew + w0 − g(e), (5.1)
π(ω, e) = e(1− w)− w0 − r, (5.2)
where r again denotes the production unit’s resale value. As before, the two agents
may develop mutual care, which is captured by the extended payoﬀ functions:
U(ω, e, b) = u(ω, e) + bπ(ω, e),
Vi(ω, e) = π(ω, e) + αiu(ω, e),
22
The worker’s care for the employer, b = βEµ[α], is again based on her reaction
coeﬃcient, β ∈ [0, 1], and her anticipation of the employer’s altruism coeﬃcient,
Eµ[α] = µKαK.
When the employer’s motives are observable, it is easy to show that the work-
er’s best response is not dependent on the ﬁxed payment, w0. Therefore, E(w, b)
is deﬁned as above in equation (2.5).
Let us start with the the employer’s decision problemwhen eﬀorts are observed.
In this case, the employer’s optimization is
max
w,w0
Vi(ω, E(w, bi)) (5.3)
s.t. i. u(ω, E(w, bi)) ≥ 0, ii. w0 ≥ 0, iii. w ≥ 0,
iv. w0 · E(w, bi) (1− w) , v. w · 1,
where bi = βµiαi.
Lemma 5.1. When motives are fully observable, the employer will oﬀer no ﬁxed
payment, w0 = 0.
Proof. The Lagrangian for the problem in (5.3) can be written as
Li = E(w, bi) (1− w)− w0 − r
+(αi + γ1i ) (E(w, bi)w + w0 − g(E(w, bi)))
+γ2iw0 + γ3iw − γ4i (w0 − E(w, bi) (1− w))− γ5 (w − 1)
= E(w, bi)
¡
1− w
¡
1− αi − γ1i + γ4i
¢
+ γ4i
¢
+ γ3iw − γ5 (w − 1)
−w0
¡
1− αi − γ1i − γ2i + γ4i
¢
− r −
¡
αi + γ1i
¢
g(E(w, bi)),
where γ·i ≥ 0 denote the Lagrangian multipliers for type i employer. Then, the
optimal choices are characterized by
∂Li
∂w =
∂E
∂w ·
¡
1− w
¡
1− αi − γ1i + γ4i
¢
+ γ4i −
¡
αi + γ1i
¢
g0
¢
(5.4)
−
¡
1− αi − γ1i + γ4i
¢
E + γ3i − γ5i (5.5)
= 0,
∂Li
∂w0
= −
¡
1− αi − γ1i − γ2i + γ4i
¢
= 0. (5.6)
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Note that the ﬁrst order condition for w0 in (5.6) implies that if w0 > 0, such
that γ2i = 0, then 1− αi − γ1i + γ4i = 0. Substituting into (5.4 — 5.5) gives
∂E
∂w · (1 + γ
4
i ) (1− g0) + γ3i − γ5i = 0. (5.7)
From the ﬁrst order condition of the worker in (2.7), we have
g0 = w (1− βαi) + βαi · 1.
Let us assume that w = 1 such that g0 = 1. But then w0 = 0 has to hold due to the
feasibility constraint w0 · (1 − w)E = 0, which contradicts w0 > 0. Also, g0 = 1
if βαi = 1. Assuming βαi < 1, w < 1 can not be an optimal choice according to
(5.7), since this implies γ5i = 0 and 1−g0 > 0. Therefore, w0 = 0 must hold except
when βαi = 1.
The result should not come as a surprise. We assumed from the start that the
worker and the employer are both risk neutral. Therefore, there is no reason for
the employer to insure the worker.
When the employer’s motives are not observable, however, the employer may
be interested in providing some ﬁxed wage to signal her type to the worker. Note
that the ﬁxed wage does not provide any direct incentives, or that the worker’s
best response function is not dependent on w0. Before continuing to provide our
seperation result, we ﬁrst show that the employer’s indiﬀerence curves satisfy the
”modiﬁed” single-crossing property when both w0 and w can be variables.
Lemma 5.2. For any given w¯, m¯ ∈ [0, 1], Vi((w¯, w0), e) and Vi((w, m¯), e) satisfy
single-crossing for w,w0 ∈ [0, 1] and e ∈ [0, E(1)].
Proof. To show that Vi((w¯, w0), e) is single-crossing is elementary since E does
not depend on w0. To show that Vi((w, m¯), e) is single-crossing, we can use the
identical line of arguments provided in the proof of Lemma 2.6, which will not be
repeated here.
As before, the previous result ensures that there exist some feasible compen-
sation oﬀers that are prefered only by a benevolent employer. The next result
summarizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 5.3. There is a unique (separating) PBE outcome (ω∗(·), e∗(·)) with
equilibrium beliefs µ∗(·) that satisfy (R) . In this unique equilibrium, w∗0(αM) = 0.
Moreover, a benevolent (type K) employer will choose to use w0 solely for sig-
naling, such that w∗i = argmaxw Vi(ω, E(w, b)) and w0 = (1− w∗K) E(w∗K ,βαK)−
(1− w∗M) E(w∗M , 0).
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Proof. Again, it is easy to show that (R) helps us eliminate all but the ”best”
separating equilibrium outcome. The proof is almost identical to the proof in
Proposition 2.7 and will not be repeated.
In order to signal her benevolent motive, a typeK employer’s oﬀer ω = (w,w0)
has to make a type M employer worse-oﬀ than her actual oﬀer, ω∗M = (w∗M , 0).
Thus,
VM(ω, E(w,βαK)) > VM(ω∗M , E(w∗M , 0)),
or equivalently,
w0 > (1− w) E(w,βαK)− (1− w∗M) E(w∗M , 0).
Then, a type K employer chooses
max
w,w0
VK(ω, E(w,βαK))
s.t. i. u(ω, E(w, bi)) ≥ 0, ii. w0 ≥ 0,
iii. w ≥ 0, iv. w0 · (1− w) E(w,βαK), v. w · 1,
vi. w0 ≥ (1− w) E(w, βαK)− (1− w∗M) E(w∗M , 0).
The Lagrangian can be written as
L = (1− w) E(w, βαK)− w0 − r + (αK + γ1) (wE(w, βαK) + w0 − g[E(w, βαK)])
+γ2w0 + γ3w − γ4 (w0 − (1− w) E(w,βαK)) + γ5 (w − 1)
+γ6 (w0 − (1− w) E(w,βαK) + (1− w∗M) E(w∗M , 0)) .
The ﬁrst order conditions are then given by
∂L
∂w =
∂E
∂w ·
¡
1− γ6 + γ4 − w (1− αK − γ1 + γ4 − γ6)−
¡
αi + γ1i
¢
g0
¢
−E (1− αK − γ1 + γ4 − γ6) + γ3 − γ5
= 0, (5.8)
∂L
∂w0
= − (1− αK − γ1 − γ2 + γ4 − γ6) = 0. (5.9)
It is easy to show that 0 < w < 1, such that γ3 = γ5 = 0. Using condition
(5.9), we then have
1 + γ4 − γ6 = γ1 + γ2 + αK .
We can rewrite the ﬁrst-order condition for w given in (5.8) as
∂L
∂w =
∂E
∂w · (γ1 + γ2 + αK − γ2w − (αK + γ1) g
0)− (1− αK) E = 0.
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This is exactly the same ﬁrst-order condition in lemma 5.1, corresponding to
the employer’s optimal wage choice when her motives are observed. Therefore,
w∗M = w
o
M and w
∗
K = w
o
K .
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